Utah v. Fred A. Alvarez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Utah v. Fred A. Alvarez : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; attorney for appellant.
Jan Graham; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Fred A. Alvarez, No. 910019.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3395














EVICTION AND FINAL * 
3E OF CRIMINAL HOMiCI 
FENSE, ENTERED IN " 
ALT LAKF COUN-
-5ESIDINC 
V YEARS MANDA 
7>V X L J C - v m »?v/ 
-an t^ 
PAUL VAN D M / 
Attorney Genea 
236 State Capst-
Salt Lake City, i' 
At1i 
Attorney' for p.,. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INSERT TO OPENING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 910019 
Priority No. 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION AND FINAL JUDGMENT FROM A 
JURY VERDICT FOR THE OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE A CAPITAL OFFENSE, ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD MOFFAT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. A SENTENCE OF LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT WITH A TWENTY YEARS MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT WAS IMPOSED BY THE COURT. 
G. FRED METOS - 2250 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Due to the number and complexity of the issues raised in this appeal, the 
standard of review is set forth in the first paragraph of each particular point in the 
brief. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 910019 
Priority No. 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION AND FINAL JUDGMENT FROM A 
JURY VERDICT FOR THE OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE A CAPITAL OFFENSE, ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD MOFFAT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. A SENTENCE OF LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT WITH A TWENTY YEARS MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT WAS IMPOSED BY THE COURT. 
G. FRED METOS - 2250 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I 
THE PROCESS OF "DEATH QUALIFICATION" OF THE JURY VENIRE 
VIOLATES THE PROTECTIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS IT 
RESULTS IN A JURY PANEL MORE PRONE TO CONVICT 11 
A. 
The Utah Constitutional Provisions Provide Greater Protections to Capital 
Defendants Than the Respective Federal Counterparts 14 
B. 
Empirical Studies Demonstrate that a Death Qualified Jury is More Prone 
to Convict Than Juries Not Subject to That Procedure 18 
C. 
The Death-Qualification of the Jury in This Case Requires That Appellant 
Receive a New Trial 20 
I 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S SYSTEMATIC USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO 
EXCLUDE MINORITY JURORS FROM THE PANEL VIOLATED THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 22 
A. 
Appellant Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination in the 
Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges 23 
B. 
The State Failed to Provide Sufficient Race Neutral Reasons to Justify 
the Peremptory Challenges to Potential Hispanic Jurors 26 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO 
HOMICIDES WERE COMMITTED INCIDENT TO A SINGLE ACT, 
SCHEME, COURSE OF CONDUCT OR CRIMINAL EPISODE 33 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO 
DISREGARD AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER 37 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ENHANCING 
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-3-203.1 (1953 AS AMENDED) 40 
A. 




Due Process is Violated by Allowing a Criminal Sentence to be Enhanced 
by Uncharged Conduct of Unnamed Parties 48 
C. 
A Defendant is Entitled to a Jury Finding of Criminal Liability Under the 
Statute Before the Sentencing Enhancement is Appropriate . . . . 50 
D. 
The Trial Court's Finding that Appellant Acted in Concert with Two or 
More People was Clearly Erroneous 52 
CONCLUSION 55 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 56 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Adams v. Texas. 448 U.S. 38 (1980) 14 
Buchanan v. Kentucky. U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987) 14 
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 23, 25, 26, 32 
Carter v. Jury Commissioner of Green County. 396 U.S. 320 (1970) 23 
Griasbv v. Mabrv. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983) 13, 18, 19, 20, 21 
Griasbv v. Mabrv. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) 18 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.. Inc.. U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991) . . 
Flovd v. State. 539 So.2d 357 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987) 26, 27, 28, 32, 22 
Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 (1972) 42, 43, 44 
Hernandez v. New York. U.S. , 111 S.CT. 1859 (1991) 25, 31 
Hovev v. Superior Court. 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980) 19 
Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352 (1983) 42, 43 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19 
Oats v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 659 (Utah 1988) 12 
Oregon v. Haas. 420 U.S. 714 (1975) 14 
People v. Granillo. 242 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Cal. App. 1987) 26 
Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. (1991) 23, 26 
Reynolds v. State. 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) 25 
Slappv v. State. 503 So.2d 350 (Fla. App. 1987) 27 
IV 
State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) 28 
State v. Bankhead. 727 P.2d 216 (Utah 1986) 23 
State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) 14 
State v. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) 44 
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Cantu I. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) 25 
State v. Cantu II. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) 23, 24, 27, 33 
State v. Casarez. 606 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982) 44 
State v. Codianna. 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977) 12 
State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah, 1988) 44 
State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) 36 
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) 14 
State v. Griasbv. 97 Wash.2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982) 36 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 34, 38, 41 
State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) 40 
State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) 24, 25 
State v. Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1971) 35 
State v. Kelback. 461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969) 12 
State v. Kincaid. 103 Wash.2d 304, 692 P.2d 823 (1985) 36 
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 12 
State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) 40 
v 
State v. Larocco. 749 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 14 
State v. McCumber. 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) 15 
State v. Moeller. 860 P.2d 130 (Or. 1991) 52 
State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) 12, 19 
State v. Norton. 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) 12 
State v. Parker. 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) 36 
State v. Roberts. 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) 44 
State v. Saunders. 622 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) 15 
State v. Schaffer. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) 12 
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) 12 
State v. Slappy. 522 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1988) 27 
State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) 23, 24, 25, 26, 33 
State v. Stewart. 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) 34 
State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1950 (Utah 1982) 12 
State v. Wedae. 652 P.2d 773 (Ore. 1982) 50, 51 , 52 
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982) 44 
United States v. David. 803 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986) 25 
Wainwriaht v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985) 14 
Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510 (1968) 12, 13, 20 
vi 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-401 (1953 as amended) 35 
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-601(1) (1953 as amended) 35 
Utah Code Annotated §76-2-202 (1953 as amended) 43, 53, 54 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-101 (1953 as amended) 48 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-207(1) (1953 as amended) passim 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-207.1 (1953 as amended) 17 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-202 (1953 as amended) 1, 6, 34, 39, 53 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-203 (1953 as amended) 35 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(i)(1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Annotated §78-46-16(1) (1953 as amended) 23 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(10) 6, 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 11, 14, 15, 44 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 9 11 ,14 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 10 11, 14, 15, 16 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12 11 , 15, 50 
vii 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Boehm, V.R., "Mr. Prejudice. Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An 
Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias." 
91968) Wisconsin Law Review 743 22 
Crossan, R., "An Investigation Into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital Tried 
Jurors." reprinted in Proceedings, 76th Annual Convention APA (1968) . . 21 , 22 
Ellsworth and Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of 
the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists. 29 Crime and Delinquency, 116-169 
(1963) 13 
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime ControL 8 Law and Human Behavior 
31 (1984), 42 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 21 13 
Goldberg, F., Capital Scruples, Jury Bias and Use of Psychological Data to Raise 
Presumptions in the Law. 5 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 53 
(1976) 13 
Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty, Readdressing the Withersooon Question, 26 
Crime and Delinquency 412-27 (1980) 13, 20 
Mitchell, H. and Byrne, D., "The Defendant's Dilemma: The Effects of Juror's 
Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decision, 25 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 123 (1975) 21 
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, (1968) 13 
Rokeach, M. MacLellan, D., "Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: A Re-Interpretation 
of the Duouesne Poll Data." 8 Duquesne Law Review 125 (1970) 22 
Smith, A Trent Analysis of Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment. 1936-1974, in J.A. 
Davis (ed.) Studies of Social for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime 
or Symbolic Attitude. 17 Law and Society Review, 121-146 (1982) 13 
Thayer, R., "Attitude and Personality Differences Between Potential Jurors Who Could 
Return the Death Verdict and Those Who Could Not." reprinted in Proceedings of 78th 
Annual Convention of the APA (1970) 21 
viii 
Vidmar and Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penaltv. 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245-
1270 (1974) , 13 
Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance. (University of Chicago, 
unpublished manuscript (1957) 13 
Zeisel, H., Some Data on Juror Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, (University of 
Chicago Study in Criminal Justice (1968)) 13 
ix 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 910019 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for a capital offense. This 
court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (i) 
(1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment entered against appellant 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard 
Moffat, Judge, presiding. On November 29, 1990, appellant was found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense, 
as described in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-202 (1953 as amended). Appellant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year mandatory minimum enhancement 
1 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) was imposed on 
November 29, 1990. Judgment was entered on December 6, 1990. Notice of appeal 
was filed on December 3, 1990. An amended notice of appeal was filed on January 
2, 1991. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 . Does the Utah Constitution prevent the use of a "death qualified" jury to 
determine a defendant's guilt or innocence in a capital case? 
2. Did the State's use of its peremptory challenges to strike two-thirds of 
the hispanics from the jury venire violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the offense of murder in the first 
degree? 
4. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on the elements of first 
degree murder? 
5. Did the trial court erroneously enhance appellant's sentence for acting 
in concert with two or more other persons? 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the United States Constitution: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; or 
2 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 9: 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, Section 10: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses 
in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal 
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
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shall not be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not 
be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 (1953 as amended): 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition,"single criminal episode" means all conduct which 
is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling the 
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1953 as amended): 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes 
speech. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953 as amended): 
Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(1) (1953 as amended): 
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is 
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided 
below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more other 
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persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties 
under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(5) (1953 as amended): 
(a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary 
offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties 
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is 
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or 
lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall 
decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under this 
section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon 
a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall 
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability of 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended): 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the following circumstances 
. . . 
The homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during 
which two or more persons are killed. 
Rule 18(3)(10) of the Utah rules of Criminal Procedure: 
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular 
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following 
grounds: . . . 
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if the offense charged is punishable with death, the 
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose 
the death penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 16, 1990, appellant, Fred A. Alvarez and Richard Gabaldon were 
jointly charged with two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1953 as amended). (R. 7-9) The information 
was amended on July 11, 1990, to include a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended). (R. 11) At the preliminary hearing, 
the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to hold Gabaldon for trial 
on the first degree murder charges. The State filed a Second Amended Information 
charging Gabaldon with two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree and charging appellant with the original counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder 
in the First Degree. (R. 29-31) Prior to trial, Gabaldon plead guilty to two counts of 
Aggravated Assault, violations of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended), 
third degree felonies. This was done in exchange for his testimony against appellant. 
(Tr. 14) 
The jury panel was "death qualified" pursuant to Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tr. 106 et. seq.) Following selection of the panel, 
appellant moved for a mistrial based on the State's discriminatory use of its 
peremptory challenges. (Tr. 484) After a ten day trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
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guilty as to Count I for the death of Don Newingham and not guilty as to Count II for 
the death of Shayne Newingham. (R. 193-195) Appellant waived his right to a jury 
trial for the death penalty phase of the proceedings. (Tr. 1415) The trial judge 
imposed a sentence of life in prison for the homicide charge which included an 
enhancement of a mandatory minimum term of twenty years pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On Friday, June 8, 1990, appellant and fifteen to twenty other juveniles and 
young adults were at a party at the home of Kim and Richard Gabaldon. (Tr. 1098, 
1059) There was considerable use of alcohol at that party. (Tr. pp. 607, 609, 613, 
1091, 1115) At approximately 11:30 p.m. a group of five uninvited individuals 
arrived. They included Don and Shayne Newingham (father and son, respectively), 
Robert Rivas, Kenny Salas and Paul Velasquez. (Tr. pp. 963, 918) Before going to the 
Gabaldon residence, those five had been drinking. The Newinghams and Salas were 
also using cocaine. (TT. 864, 867, 916-17) 
At the Gabaldon residence, Salas and Don Newingham got out of the car and 
approached the door. (Tr. 920-21) Gabaldon met the two at the front door and 
informed them that they were not welcome. (Tr. 621-22) When asked to leave, Don 
Newingham objected vehemently and became verbally abusive to those at the party. 
(Tr. at 623, 631, 636, 684, 899, 1052, 1263, 1286) At that point, appellant pulled 
a knife from his pants, held it to his chest and requested Don Newingham to leave. 
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(Tr. 615). Newingham continued to argue, and stated, "I'm not going to let no young 
punk pull no knife out on me because I'm going to stick him first." (Tr. 636, 1264) 
A pocket knife was found in Newingham's possession. (Tr. 735) 
Salas and Don Newingham eventually left the house and moved toward their 
car. (Tr. 925) Several of the individuals from inside the house followed them, 
including appellant, Gabaldon and Anthony DeHerrera. (Tr. at 635, 662, 925, 1265) 
As the group approached, Paul Valasquez exited the vehicle to talk with appellant. 
They met in front of the car where appellant informed Valasquez that he was welcome 
to come back to the party, but the Newinghams were not welcome because Gabaldon 
did not know them. (Tr. 880, 1264) As appellant and Valasquez spoke, an altercation 
broke out between Don Newingham and Gabaldon. (Tr. 880) Salas and Valasquez 
testified that Gabaldon struck Don Newingham in the face with his fist. The larger 
Newingham was then able to get Gabaldon to the ground and began to beat Gabaldon 
with his fists. (Tr. 681, 927) Salas and Valasquez testified at that time, appellant 
jumped on Don Newingham's back and stabbed him several times with a knife. (Tr. 
682, 927) Salas testified further that Don Newingham was able to push himself off 
the ground, causing appellant to fall backwards. (Tr. 928) He also testified that 
appellant, while falling, accidently stuck himself in the leg with the knife. (Tr. 926) 
Appellant testified that when the fight broke out between Gabaldon and Don 
Newingham, he kicked at Newingham and was stabbed in the leg. (Tr. 1265) 
Appellant then stated that he then began wildly swinging the knife that he had 
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previously produced. (Tr. 1266) Appellant indicated that he may have struck the elder 
Newingham with the knife, but was not sure. (Tr. 1325) Kriss Blackhorse and Shauna 
Pina, both of whom had been at the party, testified that after the fight ended, 
Anthony DeHerrera entered the house carrying two knives. (Tr. 1014, 1143) Those 
witnesses and others who spoke with DeHerrera after the fight stated that DeHerrera 
bragged about stabbing the father. (Tr. 1055, 1097, 1114) 
During the initial altercation between Don Newingham and Gabaldon, Shayne 
Newingham got out of the car and began to fight with others. (Tr. 884) He struck 
Manuel Martinez in the head, then threw Martinez into a truck, knocking him 
unconscious. (Tr. 1031, 1054, 1124, 1234) The younger Newingham then struck 
both Fernando Negrete and Manuel Alvarez with his fists. (Tr. 1092) There was 
contradictory testimony about how Shayne Newingham was stabbed. Paul Valasquez 
testified that he observed appellant stick Shayne Newingham with the knife after Don 
Newingham had been stabbed. (Tr. 886) Anthony Valerio testified that as Shayne 
Newingham "got the best" of Gabaldon, he observed Anthony DeHerrera stab Shayne 
Newingham in the shoulder. (Tr. 1236) Gabaldon testified that as he fought with 
Shayne Newingham, DeHerrera was striking Newingham in the back. (Tr. 675) 
Dr. Todd Gray, Utah State Medical Examiner, testified that both Shayne and 
Don Newingham died as a result of multiple stab wounds. (Tr. 983, 1001) Shayne 
Newingham had two knife wounds in his back, another near his armpit and a fourth 
in the abdomen. (Tr. 961-976) Don Newingham suffered three knife wounds to his 
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back. (Tr. 893-1000) Dr. Gray testified that all of the wounds were consistent with 
injuries that may be inflicted by a large hunting knife. (Tr. 983, 1002) Such a knife 
had been located by police detectives in a washing machine, under towels in the 
Gabaldon residence. (Tr. 768) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The process of "death qualification" of a jury panel violates the protections of 
the Utah Constitution. Such a process results in jury panels that are more prone to 
convict a capital defendant than juries that are not been subject to that procedure. 
A separate jury should be selected for the penalty phase of a capital trial if the "death 
qualification" procedure is to be employed. 
The State used its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in 
excluding hispanics from jury service. The reasons stated by the prosecutor for the 
exercise of those challenges were inconsistent with the information elicited from the 
potential jurors who were stricken. The exercise of the peremptory challenges in such 
a discriminatory manner violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The evidence is insufficient to establish that the two homicides were committed 
incident to a single act, scheme, course of conduct or criminal episode. That is the 
additional element that distinguishes first from second degree murder. The offense 
of conviction should be ordered reduced from first to second degree murder. 
10 
The trial court responded to a question from the jury during its deliberations in 
a manner that would lead the jury to believe that one of the elements of first degree 
murder need not be proved. Such an instruction relieved the State of proving that 
element of the offense. That error requires that a new trial be ordered. 
The application of the "gang enhancement" statute violated appellant's 
constitutional right to due process of law as that statute is void for vagueness and 
allows punishment for the unproved acts of unnamed third parties. Furthermore, 
appellant should have been entitled to a jury determination of his liability under that 
statute. Finally, the evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant acted in 
concert with two or more individuals who shared the intent to cause the death of 
another. Consequently, the trial court erroneously applied the twenty year minimum 
mandatory enhancement to appellant's sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROCESS OF "DEATH QUALIFICATION" OF THE 
JURY VENIRE VIOLATES THE PROTECTIONS OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AS IT RESULTS IN A JURY PANEL 
MORE PRONE TO CONVICT. 
Prior to trial, appellant objected to the "death qualification" of the jury venire, 
(R. 129; 376 at 8) That is the process of questioning potential jurors about their 
opinions regarding the death penalty pursuant to Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Appellant contended that the procedure creates juries which are 
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conviction prone in violation of his state constitutional rights as described in Article 
I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. This position has been rejected 
under a federal constitutional analysis.1 However, a state constitutional analysis 
warrants another result. Since this is a legal issue a standard of review of correction 
of error should be employed. Oats v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 659 (Utah 1988). 
The Supreme Court first addressed the practice of death qualification of juries 
and held that individuals expressing concern about the death penalty could not be 
excluded for cause from the jury if they would follow the court's instructions 
regarding the death penalty. Withersooon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18, (1968). 
The Court did not address the issue of whether death qualification was per se 
unconstitutional. However, the Court issued an invitation for presentation of factual 
1See State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1950 (Utah 1987) (holding that pursuant to 
Lockhartv. McCree. 476 U.S. 162 (1986), death qualification of a jury did not violate 
the defendant's federal constitutional rights, defendant's state constitutional rights 
specifically were not addressed); State v. Schaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) 
(relying on Lockhart and its analysis this Court held that "the individual, sequestered 
death-qualification voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital homicide case does not, 
in and of itself, violate the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury." id. at 
1312.); State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) (the exclusion of individuals who 
would apply the death penalty in cases even if the mitigating circumstances 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances as well as individuals who would never 
apply the death penalty, provides a balance to the death qualification process. 
However, this Court noted, "We realize that the disqualification of such persons does 
not fully meet defendant's point about conviction-prone jurors . . ." Jd. at 237); State 
v. Norton. 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (holding that like "Witherspoon Excludables" 
individuals that would automatically impose the death penalty must be excused for 
cause): See also. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Schreuder, 
726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986); State v. Codianna. 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Kelbach. 461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969). 
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data on that question in the future. The Court noted that with the presentation of 
stronger evidence, death qualified juries may be shown to be conviction prone: 
The question would then arise whether the State's interest 
in submitting the penalty issue to the jury capable of 
imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the 
expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair 
determination of guilt or innocence given the possibility of 
using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix 
punishment. 
Id. at 520, n. 10. 
Such evidence is now available. The Zeisel and Goldberg studies presented to 
the Supreme Court in Witherspoon. have since been perfected, published and 
reviewed.2 Additional studies have also been conducted. See generally: Griasbv v. 
Mabrv. 569 F.Supp. 1273, 1292, 1302-05 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 
(8th Cir. 1985), rev', Lockhart v. McCree. supra.3 In 1986, this additional evidence 
2See: Goldberg, F., Capital Scruples. Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to 
Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 53 
(1976); Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance. (University of 
Chicago, unpublished manuscript (1957); Zeisel, H., Some Data on Juror Attitudes 
Toward Capital Punishment. (University of Chicago Study in Criminal Justice (1968)). 
3Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty. Readdressing the Withersooon Question. 
26 Crime and Delinquency 412-27 (1980); Packer. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 
(1968); Vidmar and Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty. 26 Stan.L.Rev. 
1245-1270 (1974); Smith. A Trent Analysis of Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment. 
1936-1974, in J.A. Davis (ed.) Studies of Social for the Death Penalty: Instrumental 
Response to Crime or Symbolic Attitude, 17 Law and Society Review, 121-146 
(1982); Ellsworth and Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close 
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists. 29 Crime and 
Delinquency, 116-169 (1963); Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime 
Control. 8 Law and Human Behavior 31 (1984), 42 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 21 . 
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was presented to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the district court and court 
of appeals' holdings that death qualification violated a capital defendant's 
constitutional rights. Lockhart v. McCree. supra.4 See also, Adams v. Texas, 448 
U.S. 38 (1980); Wainwrioht v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
In spite of the Court's interpretation of the federal constitution this court should 
consider the constitutionality of death qualification pursuant to the more expansive 
rights of the Utah Constitution. This court is not bound by the Supreme Court's 
decisions on the federal constitution in interpreting the Utah Constitution. Oregon v. 
Haas. 420 U.S. 714, (1975); State v. Larocco. 749 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). See, e.g.. 
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 
of the Utah Constitution do not support the current practice of using the same death 
qualified jury to decide both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial.5 
A. 
The Utah Constitutional Provisions Provide Greater 
Protections to Capital Defendants Than the Respective 
Federal Counterparts. 
This court has held the language in the last sentence of Article I, Section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution, "Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
4One year later the United States Supreme Court extended the Lockhart holding 
to co-defendants who were not charged with a crime subject to the death penalty. 
Buchanan v. Kentucky, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 2906, (1987). However, the 
Buchanan analysis is likewise not binding on this court's analysis under the Utah 
Constitution. 
5Lockhart. 476 U.S. at 184. 
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unnecessary rigor," creates a protection more expansive than the federal counterpart. 
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986). This court has also interpreted 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution to afford the accused greater protection 
than the due process clause of the federal constitution. In State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1986), the due process protection of the Utah Constitution was extended 
to safeguard an accused from the refiling of criminal charges already dismissed at a 
preliminary hearing. In State v. Saunders, 622 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah 1985), the court 
cited State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980), in recognizing due process is 
violated when prejudicial evidence reaches the jury where severance would have 
prevented that evidence from being admitted, thus curing the problem. 
Support for more expansive rights for the capital defendant can be found in the 
discussion and debates of the State Constitution Convention regarding Article I, 
Section 10:6 
Mr. Evans(Weber): But I see no reason why the trial of 
ordinary criminal cases, there might not be a jury of nine, 
as well as in civil cases, with a unanimous verdict, except 
possibly in the case where the punishment might be capital. 
A case so grave as that, some provision might be made 
why the time-honored system of the jury might be 
unchanged. I introduce this amendment, so it will raise 
these questions, and I doubt not but that it will be 
6Article I, Section 10 provides: 
In capital cases the right of the trial bv jury shall remain inviolate. In Courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In 
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded, [emphasis added] 
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discussed with all deliberation, but for the best interest of 
the new State, and also from a point of economy, if the 
service can be retained the same. I hope it carried. 
[emphasis added] 
Proceedings Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 258-59. 
Mr. Squires. There is another provision there about capital 
punishment is not there? 
Mr. Evans (Weber): Yes: and I thank the gentlemen for 
calling my attention to it. In capital offenses, where a man 
is upon trial for his life, we preserve the old common law 
jury of twelve men, who must render a unanimous verdict. 
The provision is carefully drawn, and I think expresses the 
view of the committee of the whole the other day, when 
we were discussing that question. 
Proceedings Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 493. 
The official report of the proceedings and debates of the constitutional 
convention indicates that economy and expense were the concern in reducing the 
number of jurors required to sit in non-capital cases.7 Analysis of the history of 
Article I, Section 10 illustrates concerns for economy and expense were not sufficient 
to compromise the rights of those individuals facing the death penalty. In Lockhart 
the Supreme Court relied heavily on considerations of economy and efficient trial 
management to uphold the State of Arkansas' interest of having one jury sit and 
Reference to expense and economy can be found in the Proceedings 
Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 259, 261, 276, 278, 279, 287 and 
296. 
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decide both the issue of guilty and punishment.8 Thus, the basis for the decision in 
Lockhart is inapplicable to an analysis of the Utah Constitution. The historical basis 
of the Utah Constitution excluding economic consideration from the jury selection 
process in capital cases. That line of reasoning does not provide support for the 
practice of death qualifying the jury sitting during the guilt phase of such a trial. The 
constitutional debates support the position that the jury considering innocence or guilt 
should not be death qualified. In the event the defendant is found guilty, a second 
jury should be impaneled. That jury may be subjected to the "death qualification" 
process. 
The legislature has contemplated and provided for circumstances where it is 
impractical to reconvene the jury that determined guilt for the sentencing phase. In 
such situations, the court may convene a new jury for the limited purpose of 
sentencing, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(1) (1953 as amended). In light of the 
conviction prone nature of a death qualified jury9, this court should require trial courts 
8This concern was articulated by the Court as follows, 
. . . in most, if not all, capital cases much of the evidence adduced 
at the guilt phases of the trial will also have a bearing on the penalty 
phase: if two different juries were to be required, such testimony would 
have to be presented twice, once to each jury. 
Lockhart. 476 U. S. at 181. 
9See: Point I, B, infra. 
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to engage in a bifurcated proceeding in which the jury determining guilt would not be 
subjected to the death qualification process. 
B. 
Empirical Studies Demonstrate that a Death Qualified Jury 
is More Prone to Convict Than Juries Not Subject to That 
Procedure. 
In determining the effect of the death qualification procedure, this court should 
consider Mr. Justice Marshall's persuasive summary of the reasoning of the studies 
described in Griasby v. Mabrv, supra. He noted, 
In the wake of Witherspoon, a number of researchers set 
out to supplement the data that the Court had found 
inadequate in that case. The results of these studies were 
exhaustively analyzed by the District Court in this case, see 
Griasbv v. Mabrv (Grigsby II), 569 F.Supp. 1273, 1291-
1308 (E.D.Ark. 1983) and can only be briefly summarized 
here, [footnote omitted] The data strongly suggest that the 
death qualification excludes a significantly large subset-at 
least 1 1 % to 17%-of potential jurors who could be 
impartial during the guilt phase of the trial, [footnote 
omitted] Among the members of the excludable class are 
a disproportionate number of blacks and women. See id., 
at 1283, 1293-1294. 
The perspectives on the criminal justice system of 
jurors who survive death qualification are systematically 
different from those of excluded jurors. Death-qualified 
jurors are, for example, more Jikely to believe that a 
defendant's failure to testify is indicative of his guilt, more 
hostile to the insanity defense, more distrustful of defense 
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of 
erroneous convictions, id-at 1283, 1293, 1304. This pro-
prosecution bias is reflected in the greater readiness of 
death qualified jurors to convict or to convict more serious 
charges, id. at 1294-1302; Griasbv v. Mabrv, 758 F.2d 
226, 233-236 (8th Cir. 1985). And, finally, the very 
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process of death qualification-which focuses attention on 
the death penalty before the trial has ever began-has been 
found to predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that 
the defendant is guilty. 569 F.Supp., at 1302-1305; 758 
F.2d at 234. 
Lockhart v. McCree, supra at 156-57 (Marshall J., dissenting). 
This court needs to consider the great weight of these studies. In Griasbv. the 
state's witness conceded that the studies were conducted with sound methodology. 
Griasbv. supra, at 1309. Further, no evidence or studies contrary to those presented 
to the trial court in Griasbv were provided by the state. As noted by Justice Marshall, 
Yet even after considering the evidence adduced by 
the State, the Court of Appeals properly noted: "There are 
no studies which contradict the studies submitted [by 
respondent]; in other words, all of the documented studies 
supported the district court's findings." [Griasbv v. Mabrvl 
758 F.2d at 238. 
476 U.S. at 190. (Marshall, dissenting) 
Courts reviewing these studies have found that the death qualification process 
"stacks the deck" against the defendant, creating a conviction prone jury that is 
underrepresentative of the community. Griasbv v. Mabrv, supra, at 1292, 1302-05; 
Hovev v. Superior Court. 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980). In State v. Moore, supra, the 
court noted that with respect to studies evidencing death qualified juries being more 
inclined to convict than non-death-qualified juries, this court stated, "The defendant's 
data may well be correct. It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the 
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determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to 
convict/" Witherspoon. supra, at 521.10 
C. 
The Death-Qualification of the Jury in this Case Requires 
That Appellant Receive a New Trial. 
It is not disputed that the voir dire in the instant case was carefully conducted 
in an effort to mitigate negative effects.11 However, the process of death 
qualification is inherently flawed and the trial court's care in conducting voir dire 
merely served to heighten the jurors' focus on the death penalty and a presumption 
of guilt.12 Individuals who have scruples concerning the death penalty tend to have 
10The district court judge in Griasby stated: 
"A jury so selected [through the use of the death qualification process] 
will not, therefore, be composed of a cross section of the community, 
rather, it will be composed of a group of persons who are uncommonly 
predisposed to favor the persons who are uncommonly predisposed to 
favor the prosecution, a jury "organized to convict." 
Griasbv, 569 F. Supp. at 1304 relying on Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty 
Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, supra. 
11The general text of the voir dire concerning death penalty issues is set forth at 
R. 281-284. Counsel were allowed to further question those jurors expressing 
scruples about the death penalty to determine if such scruples could be set aside if 
the aggravating factors out weighed the mitigating factors. 
12The district court judge in Griasbv summarized the effect of focusing on the 
death penalty prior to trial as follows: 
E5y focusing on the penalty before the trial actually begins the key 
participants, the judge, the prosecutor and the defense counsel convey 
the impression that they all believe the defendant is guilty, that the 
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"due process" concerns whereas individuals who survive death qualification tend to 
have "law and order" concerns. Griasbv. supra, at 1311.13 The process of 
questioning jurors on the issue of the death penalty allows the State to identify and 
remove individuals who tend to focus on "due process" concerns. Those individuals 
would tend to view the evidence from a more neutral position than individuals who 
focus on "law and order" concerns and tend to be conviction prone. 
On the basis of the currently available studies on death qualification, this court 
should find that such a process and the subsequent removal of individuals from the 
jury panel based on information received during that process creates a jury that is 
conviction prone. Consequently, that process violates the protections of the Utah 
Constitution. Furthermore, the history and background of the Utah Constitution are 
inconsistent with the economic concerns that underlie the rulings of the federal 
"real" issue is the appropriate penalty, and that the defendant really 
deserves the death penalty. 
Griasbv 569 F. Supp. at 1303. 
13Mitchell, H. and Byrne, D., "The Defendant's Dilemma: The Effects of Juror's 
Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decision. 25 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 123 (1975); Thayer, R., "Attitude and Personality Differences 
Between Potential Jurors Who Could Return the Death Verdict and Those Who Could 
Not." reprinted in Proceedings of 78th Annual convention of the APA (1970); 
Crossan, R., "An Investigation Into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital Tried 
Jurors." reprinted in Proceedings, 76th Annual Convention APA (1968); Boehm, V.R., 
"Mr. Prejudice. Miss Sympathy, an the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of 
Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias." (1968) Wisconsin 
Law Review 743; Rokeach, M. MacLellan, D., "Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: 
A Re-lnteroretation of the Duouesne Poll Data." 8 Duquesne Law Review 125 (1970). 
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constitutional cases. The procedure of "death qualification" was applied in appellant's 
case. Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the district 
court for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S SYSTEMATIC USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE MINORITY JURORS FROM 
THE PANEL VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Following the jury selection and prior to the swearing in of the jury, appellant 
objected to the prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes to remove 
minority jurors. (Tr. 513 ) u Subsequent to the objection, the trial court required the 
prosecutor state the reasons for exercising the challenges against two of the three 
hispanics on the panel. (Tr. 524-25) Based on those explanations, the trial court 
found those peremptory challenges were not race related. In reviewing the factual 
determinations of the trial court, this court should employ a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Cantu II. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989). 
The State may not systematically exclude minorities from a jury through the use 
of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), State v. Cantu 
II. supra; State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991). The Supreme Court summarized 
such challenge to a racially based exercise of peremptory challenges as follows: 
u l n State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986), this court held that such 
a challenge must be brought prior to the swearing in of the jury. See also: Utah Code 
Ann. §78-46-16(1) (1953 as amended). 
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In Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. , (1991), we held that a 
criminal defendant, regardless of his or her race, may object 
to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion of persons from the 
petit jury. Our conclusion rested on a two-part analysis. 
First, following our opinions in Batson and in Carter v. Jury 
Commission of Greene County. 396 U.S. 320 (1970), we 
made clear that a prosecutor's race-based peremptory 
challenge violated the equal protection rights of those 
excluded from jury service. 499 U.S. 113. Second, we 
relied on well-established rules of third-party standing to 
hold that a defendant may raise third-party standing to hold 
that a defendant may raise the excluded juror's equal 
protection rights. 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. Inc.. U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991). 
This court has recently addressed this issue in State v. Cantu II. supra, and State v. 
Span, supra. The issue was also addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. 
Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. 
Appellant Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 
in the Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges. 
The determination of whether " . . . a prima facie case has been established 
requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including whether there has been 
a pattern of strikes against members of a particular group." Edmonson, supra, at 
2088. This court has established the following requirements: 
The elements necessary to such a prima facie case include 
(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that 
persons excluded belong to a cognizable group under the 
representative cross-section rule, and (3) a showing that 
there exists "a strong likelihood that such persons are being 
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challenged because of their group association rather than 
because of any specific bias." (citation omitted). 
State v. Cantu II. supra, at 518. 
In the instant case, seventy-seven jurors were called to appear before the court, 
three were excused by the court prior to trial, fourteen were excused for cause, and 
twenty-four were stricken by peremptory challenges. (R. 223-26) At least four of the 
potential jurors were hispanic.15 (Tr. 489-94, 514-25) Hispanics are a cognizable 
minority. Hernandez v. New York. U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991), State v. 
Cantu I. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), State v. Harrison, supra. Of those potential 
jurors, one was excused for cause,16 two were challenged by the prosecution's first 
and fifth peremptory strikes, Annie Sanchez and Wendy Mayeda, respectively. One 
other, Robert Galvez, sat on the jury. (R. 223-26) The state's exclusion of 67% of 
the potential hispanic jurors constitutes a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
In Span, the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to strike the only 
minority juror constituted a prima facie case of discriminatory use of the challenge. 
In United States v. David. 803 F.2d 1567 (11thCir. 1986), the court held that "under 
Batson. the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the 
striking of some black jurors are shown", 803 F.2d at 1571. In Reynolds v. State. 
15The parties and court determined race based on juror surnames and appearance. 
(Tr. 519-20) 
16Madylon Ramos was an acquaintance of appellant's parents. (Tr. 55) 
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576 So.2d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 1991), the court noted that excusal of all minority 
members was sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the state. See also, Flovd v. 
State. 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala.Cr. App. 1987). Additionally, the mere fact that one 
hispanic juror sat on the jury does not preclude a prima facie showing of a 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. People v. Granillo, 242 Cal.Rptr. 639, 
645 (Cal. App. 1987). 
The defendant and the stricken jurors need not be of the same racial minority 
to advance a Batson challenge, Powers v. Ohio, supra. However, racial identity 
between the defendant and jurors heightens the inference of discrimination, 
. . . racial identity between the defendant and the excused 
person might in some cases be the explanation for the 
prosecution's adoption of the forbidden stereotype, and if 
the alleged race bias takes this form, it may provide one of 
the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a 
conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has 
occurred. [Batson] 111 S.Ct. at 1373-74. 
Span, supra at 23. In this case, the minority jurors who were stricken were of the 
same race as appellant. The inference of discrimination is heightened in this case 
even though one hispanic sat on the jury. 
The majority of the hispanic potential jurors were excluded by the state 
exercising its peremptory challenges. Those potential jurors were of the same race 
as appellant. Consequently, appellant established a prima case of discrimination 
requiring the State bear the burden of establishing race neutral reasons for the use of 
peremptory challenges against potential jurors Wendy Mayeda and Annie Sanchez. 
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B. 
The State Failed to Provide Sufficient Race Neutral Reasons 
to Justify the Peremptory Challenges of Potential Hispanic 
Jurors. 
In Flovd v. State, supra, the court noted that it is the responsibility of the trial 
judge to: 
. . . not merely accept the specific reasons given by the 
prosecutor at face value, see Hall. 35 Cal.3d at 168, 672 
P.2d at 858-59, 197 Cal.Rptr. at 75; Slappv, 503 So.2d at 
356; the judge must consider whether the facially neutral 
explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group 
discrimination . . . The evaluation by the trial judge is 
necessary because it is possible that an attorney, although 
not intentionally discriminating, may try to find reasons 
other than race to challenge a black juror, when race may 
be his primary factor in deciding to strike the juror. 
539 So.2d at 361. This court has articulated the following "list of factors which cast 
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation: 
. . . the presence of one or more of these factors will 
tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually 
supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext: 
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror 
in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing 
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out 
for special questioning designed to evoke a certain 
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the 
facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reason 
equally applicable to juror[sic] who were not challenged. 
State v. Slappv. 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988); See Slappy 
v. State. 503 So.2d 350 (Fla.App. 1987) 
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State v. Cantu IL suora. Evaluation of the prosecutor's stated reasons in this case 
reveals that those reasons are merely a subterfuge for a racially based motivation.17 
In response to the trial court's request for a statement of reasons why Wendy 
Mayeda was stricken, the deputy county attorney stated: 
[Mr. Morgan, Deputy County Attorney]: I would like 
to proceed in case the Court's finding that there is no 
systematic exclusion to set aside. The prosecutor's neutral 
non-race reasons are as follows: Wendy Mayeda, that 
State took off, Juror No. 21 , for the following reasons: 
She's youthful, she indicated she would be suffering a 
financial hardship and she also indicated she has personal 
problems and would have difficulty in concentrating, and 
that she's going through a separation, even though she is 
not married at the time. She also indicated that although 
she would follow the Court's instruction with regard to the 
death penalty, that she had some scruples over the death 
penalty, for those reasons, the State elected its peremptory 
challenge and removed Wendy Mayeda from the panel. 
(Tr. 524) 
The age of the selected jurors Stacy Korth, (24 years old) and Christine 
Albrycht, age (28 years old) illustrates that the prosecutor's claim that Wendy Mayeda 
was removed because of her youth (25 years old) was at best a pretext. With respect 
to the issue of juror age, this court has noted, 
w[a]ge (in adults) . . . may not be used to render an 
individual incompetent as a prospective juror, but an 
exploration of the attitudes and convictions that may exist 
in a person who belongs to those groups is certainly 
17The entire voir dire testimony of both Mayeda and Sanchez is set out in the 
addendum. 
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permissible to aid in discovering actual bias or prejudice 
relating to the subject matter of a particular case. 
State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 at 1057 (Utah 1984). The youth of a potential juror and 
the youth of the defendant is an insufficient reason to rebut a prima facie showing of 
discrimination absent more detailed questioning during voir dire as to potential juror 
bias related to the age similarity. Flovd. 539 So.2d at 363. This is particularly true 
in the instant case where one of the victims is also young. Wendy Mayeda was asked 
no questions concerning her age or potential bias that her age as related to the 
defendant's age may raise. 
Wendy Mayeda's personal problems were also articulated as a reason for 
striking her from the jury. Ms. Mayeda never indicated that she could not serve on 
the jury. She merely appraised counsel and the court that she was having some 
personal problems.18 The trial judge acknowledged her concern but noted, "It's a 
18The interchange between the court and Ms. Mayeda went as follows: 
The Court: I believe the bailiff indicated to me yesterday that you had 
some concerns that you wanted to voice privately. 
Ms. Mayeda: Yeah. I'm going through a separation right now. We're 
not married, we just lived together. And I'm just having a really hard 
time with trying to deal with all that; and then trying to deal with this 
and concentrate on this, too. And I just wanted to bring that to your 
attention and let you know. 
The Court: . . . I don't mean to belittle your problems, but we do need 
your services and that you would need to be able to apply your attention 
and your best efforts to help us solve this case. 
Ms. Mayeda: Yes. I would try. 
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problem that somebody, either you or somebody like you, is going to have to spend 
some time on this jury . . . All of us in life, unfortunately, have to go through personal 
crisis as well as do other things that are required of them during the course of their 
life. . . " (Tr. 237) The trial judge observed Ms. Mayeda's demeanor and ability to 
concentrate. He was satisfied that she was qualified to serve as a juror. Her 
response to questioning was appropriate and forthright. There was no indication that 
Ms. Mayeda would have been impaired in her duties as a juror. 
The prosecutor also asserted that Ms. Mayeda was removed because of her 
scruples concerning the death penalty. This reason to raises other legal concerns.19 
However, when considered in the context of the other reasons given and the manner 
of exclusion, it is questionable whether this was actually the prosecutor's concern 
rather than Ms. Mayeda's race. Jurors, Carr, Galvez and Chedester also expressed 
some degree of concern over the death penalty or appropriate circumstances in which 
the death penalty should be applied but were not removed by the State. Illustrative 
of the inconsistency in the prosecutor's asserted concern is the situation with juror 
Chedester. She was not removed from the venire even after stating that she did not 
believe in the death penalty, but would be able to apply the law.20 
(Tr. 237-238) 
19See: Point I, B, supra. 
20Juror Chedester at one point made the following statement: "As I did say, you 
know, I am not sure if I believe in capital punishment, but probably one of the few 
that don't." (Tr. 301) 
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The prosecutor did not challenge Ms. Mayeda for cause based on either her 
personal problems or her concerns about the death penalty. However, other 
veniremen were removed for these same reasons. "If the such concerns were valid 
and substantiated by the record, they would have supported a challenge for cause. 
"The fact that the prosecutor did not make any such challenge . . . should disqualify 
him from advancing the concern as a justification of a peremptory challenge." 
Hernandez v. New York, supra, (1991) (Stevens dissenting). 
Finally, the prosecutor stated that serving on the jury would be a financial 
hardship to Ms. Mayeda. There is no support in the record for such a statement. (Tr. 
89-96; 236-246) This unsubstantiated reason merely casts doubt on all of the other 
reasons articulated by the prosecutor. The prosecutor merely rattled off a list of 
facially appropriate reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, none of which can 
withstand scrutiny or are supported by the record. The only conclusion to be drawn 
was that Ms. Mayeda was stricken based on her race. 
The prosecutor articulated the following reasons for the use of his initial 
peremptory challenge against Annie Sanchez: 
With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, the 
State pre-empted her for the following neutral, non-racial 
reasons. She is youthful, she's 21 years old. She seemed 
to identify with the defendant during the course of the jury 
voir dire. She was constantly looking at him. She also 
indicated that she has scruples against the death penalty, 
even though she would follow, she had to be talked to 
quite a bit in comparison to the rest of the jurors, about her 
ability to pass on the death penalty; therefore, for those 
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reasons, the State preempted Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, 
using its first preemptory challenge. 
Mr. VanSciver [defense counsel]: All right. Seemed 
to identify with the defendant is the very basis why his pre-
emptory and it's his first one. 
Mr. Morgan [the prosecutor]: Good point. 
Mr. VanSciver: It's race oriented. 
Mr. Morgan: Good point. Like to clarify that. 
Seemed to identify based upon her youth, based on her eye 
contact with him and based on her friendliness toward the 
defendant. Not that she identified in the sense they were 
from the same culture. 
(Tr. 524-25) 
The same argument as articulated with respect to Wendy Mayeda's youth 
applies to Ms. Sanchez. However, Ms. Sanchez was questioned about her potential 
bias in light of the closeness of her age to the defendant. She was unequivocal in her 
answer that her youth and the defendant's youth would not effect her ability to render 
a fair verdict.21 No other juror was questioned concerning age bias including either 
21During the individual voir dire with Ms. Sanchez, the following exchange took 
place: 
Mr. Morgan [the prosecutor]: One question. Mrs. Sanchez, you're 21? 
Ms. Sanchez: Yeah. 
Mr. Morgan: You think you can take a look at this case, and evidence, 
and put aside any feelings of sympathy you may have? 
Ms. Sanchez: Yeah. 
Mr. Morgan: The fact the defendant is very young, is that going to 
bother you? 
Ms. Sanchez: No. 
(Tr. 413) 
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Mr. Cabot Nelson, age 18 (Tr. 154) or Wendy Mayeda. The prosecutor's questioning 
of Ms. Sanchez on the age issue appears to be a selective attempt to illicit a response 
that could provide an excuse to remove her from the jury panel. Floyd, supra. 
The prosector next noted that Ms. Sanchez appeared to identify with appellant. 
As noted by trial counsel, this reasoning goes to the heart of a Batson challenge. 
Absent all of the surrounding facts, this would be a legitimate reason to exclude any 
juror. However, identification with the defendant is a particularly suspect reason for 
exclusion, when the potential juror and defendant are of the same race, State v. Span, 
supra. This is because this perceived identification was no more than a subtle 
stereotypical race categorizing of the defendant and Ms. Sanchez. Royd, supra at 
361. 
Finally, the prosecutor reasoned that "she had to be talked to quite a bit in 
comparison to the rest of the jurors, about her ability to pass on the death penalty." 
The record belies this contention. When questioned concerning the death penalty, 
Ms. Sanchez stated: 
The Court: All right. Do you have any feelings about the death penalty? 
Ms. Sanchez: No. 
The Court: If, in this case, after the evidence were heard by the jury 
regarding mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances, and 
you personally don't worry about the other jurors. But you personally 
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to your own satisfaction 
that the aggravating circumstances out weighed the mitigation 
circumstances; and secondly, that death was the only appropriate 
penalty; would you be able to vote for the death penalty? 
Ms. Sanchez: Yes. (Tr. 409) 
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Other potential jurors were subjected to much more extensive questioning about the 
death penalty.22 
The prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike Ms. Mayeda and Ms. 
Sanchez in a discriminatory manner meets the requirements of Cantu II. Both of those 
potential jurors belong to a cognizable racial group. The record indicates that there 
is a strong likelihood that those two jurors were challenged because of their race 
rather than any specific bias. The acceptance of the prosecutor's reasons for 
exercising the peremptory challenges as not based on race was clearly erroneous. 
The use of the State's peremptory challenges in this manner denied the potential 
jurors of their constitutional right to equal protection. As previously discussed, 
appellant has third party standing to challenge the denial of that right. Appellant's 
judgment and conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE TWO HOMICIDES WERE COMMITTED INCIDENT TO 
A SINGLE ACT, SCHEME, COURSE OF CONDUCT OR 
CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the court must consider 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Stewart. 729 
P.2d 610 (Utah 1986). This court must further determine if the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
"Illustrative of such questioning of potential jurors expressing concern about the 
death penalty is that of potential juror Johnson. (Tr. 323-335) 
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entertained a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232 (Utah 1992). 
The appellant was convicted of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
First Degree, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended). 
That statute provides: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the following circumstances 
The homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during 
which two or more persons are killed. 
That statute has not previously been interpreted by the courts of this state. The 
questionable part as applied to this case requires that the "death was caused under 
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons where 
killed." That is the element that distinguishes first degree from second degree murder. 
Second degree murder is established if the State proves that the defendant knowingly 
or intentionally caused the death of another. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as 
amended). 
The word "act" and the phrase "criminal episode" are defined in the criminal 
code. "Act" is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1953 as amended). That 
statute provides: " 'Act ' means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech." 
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The phrase "single criminal episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 (1953 
as amended). That statue provides: 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
The cases addressing this statute generally deal with a single defendant committing 
a series of criminal offenses. In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), this 
court held that there was not a single criminal episode where the defendant 
committed a robbery in one county and kidnapped hitchhikers in another county. 
Likewise, in State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the evidence did not 
establish a single criminal episode where the defendant unlawfully took a vehicle then 
failed to stop at the command of a police officer. In State v. Parker, 705 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1985), this court held that separate burglaries in separate buildings in an 
apartment complex do not constitute a single criminal episode. 
"Scheme" and "course of conduct" are not defined by statute. However, there 
are several cases interpreting a similar provision in the Washington homicide statute. 
In State v. Kincaid. 103 Wash.2d 304, 692 P.2d 823 (1985), the court noted that the 
phase "common scheme or plan" as used in that double homicide statute required that 
there be a connection or nexus between the murders and the victims. The court went 
on to note that a "scheme or plan" is a design, method of action or system formed 
to accomplish a purpose. In Kincaid the defendant entered a house and killed two 
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people. Earlier, in State v. Griosbv. 97 Wash.2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), that same 
court had held that the statute requires that there be a nexus between the killings to 
constitute a common scheme or plan as described in the homicide statute. 
In this case appellant was acquitted of Count II for the murder of Shayne 
Newingham. Consequently, the two homicides were not caused by the same act. All 
of the other provisions of the statute require some type of agreement or plan. There 
was no evidence of such a scheme, plan or common objective in this case. The 
Newinghams were not expected at the party. The evidence supporting the conviction 
indicated that Don Newingham and Kenny Salas came to the door of the residence. 
(Tr. 920-921) When they were told to leave, Newingham objected and appellant 
showed a knife and requested them to leave. (Tr. 615) Salas got Newingham to the 
car where Gabaldon struck Newingham in the face. (Tr. 681, 927) Newingham 
knocked Gabaldon to the ground and appellant stabbed Newingham in the back, 
resulting in his death. (Tr. 682, 927) 
The jury was instructed on this issue of accomplice liability. (Tr. 301 ).23 and 
appellant was acquitted of the death of Shayne Newingham as alleged in Count II of 
23That instruction provided: 
Every person acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense is 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
(R. 301) 
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the Information. Consequently, the State is not entitled to the same inferences with 
respect to that count as it is with respect to the offense of conviction. The evidence 
indicated that Shayne Newingham got out of the car as the fight broke out with his 
father. (Tr. 884) He knocked out Manuel Martinez then hit Manuel Alvarez and 
Fernando Negrete. (Tr. 1031, 1054, 1092, 1124, 1234) Shayne Newingham was 
stabbed with a large knife and died as a result of those wounds. (Tr. 983) The entire 
fight lasted only a matter of minutes. 
There was no evidence of any plan, scheme or criminal objective to cause the 
deaths of Shayne and Don Newingham. Consequently, there was insufficient 
evidence to establish the element that distinguished first from second degree murder. 
The judgment and conviction for murder in the first degree must be reversed. The 
case should be remanded to the district court with an order to impose judgment for 
the lesser offense of murder in the second degree. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY TO DISREGARD AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
The trial court initially correctly instructed the jury on the elements of first 
degree murder as described in Count I of the Information. (R. 303) However, in 
response to questions from the jury raised during their deliberations, the court 
improperly instructed the jury to disregard an essential element of that offense. (R. 
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200) Questions relating to jury instructions are matters of law which this court 
reviews for correctness. State v. Hamilton, supra. 
Paragraph 3 of the jury instruction number 11 described the element that 
distinguished first from second degree murder.24 (R. 303) That paragraph stated, 
"That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death under 
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident 
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode 
during which two or more persons were killed. (R. 303) 
Defense counsel had argued during the course of the proceedings that appellant would 
have to be criminally liable for both murders to be convicted of first degree murder. 
(Tr. 1405) During their deliberations, the jurors made written requests for clarification 
of this paragraph of instruction number 11. 
The critical question asked by the jury during their deliberations was as follows, 
"In Instruction no. 11 element no. 3. [sic] Do you need to satisfy all elements listed 
or just one?" (R. 200) The court responded, over objection of appellant (Tr. 1407), 
as follows: "Any single element set forth in paragraph no. 3 of Instruction no. 11 is 
sufficient." (R. 200) In another inquiry, the jury asked if they needed to find the 
defendant guilty of both murders to convict him of Murder in the First Degree? (R. 
196) The trial court responded by directing the jurors to instructions 6, 11, 12, 13 
and 18. (R. 196) 
24See: Point III, infra. 
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The third element described in Instruction no. 11 contains two parts. First, the 
death was caused under circumstances where the homicide was committed incident 
to one act, scheme, course of conduct or criminal episode. Second, two or more 
persons were killed. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended). By telling 
the jury that only one of the parts or elements of that third paragraph need be 
established, the trial court essentially told the jury that the State need to prove only 
that two or more persons were killed.25 It is error for the trial court to fail to instruct 
the jury on an essential element of the offense. In State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1980) the court held that it is prejudicial error to instruct the jury that the offense of 
theft by deception requires an intent to deprive. Likewise, in State v. Harmon. 712 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), the court found prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury 
on the elements of attempt, when the defendant is charged with attempted robbery. 
In the instant case, it was error to instruct the jury to disregard one of the two parts 
of the element that distinguished first from second degree murder. 
The answer to the jury's inquiry was clearly a misstatement of the law. There 
is a reasonable likelihood, based on this instruction and the response to the 
subsequent question, that the jurors believed that they need only find that two 
persons were killed to convict appellant of first degree murder. Furthermore, as 
25The appropriate response to the question would be to instruct the jury that they 
had to find any one of the alternatives of one act, scheme, course of conduct or 
criminal episode. Further, the jury would also have to find that alternative occurred 
when two or more persons were killed. 
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previously discussed,26 the evidence was not sufficient to prove the first requirement 
of this particular element. That increases the likelihood that the jurors found only that 
two deaths occurred. Consequently, the error was prejudicial. The judgment and 
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ENHANCING APPELLANT'S SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-3-203.1 (1953 AS 
AMENDED). 
The amended information filed in this case alleged a sentencing enhancement 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended).27 (R. 10-11) A 
general objection based on constitutional grounds was made to this enhancement. (Tr. 
1422) The review of the constitutionality of this provision involves a legal question 
and the court should apply a correction of error standard, State v. Hamilton, supra. 
The issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the 
enhancement provision should be reviewed under the same standard as described in 
Point III, supra.28 
The applicable portion of that statute provides: 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is 
26See: Point II, supra. 
27Commonly referred to as the "gang enhancement". 
28See page 28, supra. 
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subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided 
below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in 
this section means the defendant and two or more other 
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties 
under Section 76-2-202. 
The statute involves two due process violations. First, it is void for vagueness. 
Second, the statute allows for enhanced penalties based on uncharged or unproved 
conduct of unnamed persons. The third legal question relates to the right to a jury 
trial in the application of the enhancement. In this case, the trial court committed 
further error because there was insufficient evidence to apply the statute. 
A. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) is 
Void for Vagueness. 
The due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the 
application of criminal statutes that are vague. In Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 
U.S. 104 (1972), the Court described this doctrine: 
it is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A 
vague law impermissibility delegates basic policy matters to 
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policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective bias, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a 
vague statue "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First 
Amendment freedoms," it operates to inhibit the exercise 
of those freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead 
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than 
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked." [citations omitted] 
408 U.S. at 108-109. 
In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), the Court explained that the 
vagueness doctrine is critical with respect to a legislative failure to define criminal 
standards: 
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual 
freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory 
limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive 
authority and content as well as for definiteness or 
certainty of expression. 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. Although the doctrine focuses on actual 
notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have 
recognized recently that the more important aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other 
principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such 
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a 
standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections, [citations 
omitted] 
461 U.S. at 357-358. 
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The first issue to be addressed under this test is whether Utah Code Ann. §76-
3-203.1 (1953 as amended) gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, Gravned, 
suora. It would be unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand 
what it is to act in concert, or with joint intent, with two or more unidentified people. 
That person would be unable to conform his conduct to such a law. See Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1)(a) and (b); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202; Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
203.1 §(5)(b). 
The next issue to be addressed is whether Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 
as amended) provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute or does it 
impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application, Gravned. supra. The statute covers any situation 
where more than two people may be charged with a crime. There are no limits on the 
discretion of prosecutors who may request that the statue be applied in a particular 
case. Likewise, there is no requirement that a prosecutor has to request the 
enhancement. Furthermore, the statute may be applied based on the actions of 
uncharged and unnamed individuals, thus denying defendants notice of the allegations 
against them and precluding a defendant from meeting those allegations. In State v. 
Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) and State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 
1982). The court found that fundamental fairness required that a criminal defendant 
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be allowed to inspect a presentence report. Relying on the actions of uncharged and 
unnamed parties is analogous to preventing a defendant from meeting the unfounded 
accusations in a presentence report. The final problem with respect to the lack of 
standards is that the statute does not provide any particular burden of proof to be 
applied by the judge in making his findings.29 That allows the statute to be applied 
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The trial judge in this case did not make 
any conclusions that any particular burden of proof was applied by him. (R. 346-7) 
The last issue to be addressed under the federal standard is whether the statute 
infringes upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms and might chill the 
exercise of those protected freedoms. Gravned. supra. This statute does potentially 
impinge on the right to association, freedom of speech, to peaceably assemble and 
receive the benefits of uniform operation of the law. 
In addition to these three tests the due process clause of the Utah Constitution 
requires that legislation must meet its purpose in a rational manner. In State v. 
Cooeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah, 1988), this court held that Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution required that portions of a statute governing the sentencing of 
mentally ill offenders be stricken because the statutory provisions bore no rational 
relationship to the purposes of the statute. The legislative history of the gang 
29When a death sentence is at issue the State must meet a burden or "proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt" State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). That same 
burden of proof ought to be applied to the enhancement statute. 
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enhancement statute indicates that it was intended to be used in relatively limited 
circumstances.30 
While the purpose of the statute is not clear on its face. The record of the 
senate and house debates indicates that the statute was intended by the legislature 
to be enforced in select cases involving gangs. Senator Fordham, the sponsor of the 
bill in the Senate, stated, 
Originally, we had a bill called the "Organization Gang Bill.w 
In an working with California, who this bill was patterned 
after, their bill, and after they passed their law, we had an 
influx of gang members coming from California and 
infiltrating into Utah and establishing residence here and 
working as ah in their organization as members of, who had 
broken off from the California gangs. I think we need to 
send a message to these organized people that there isn't 
a place for them in Utah. 
(T. 8) 
The house sponsor of the bill, Representative Rushton, described Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-203.1 as necessary to combat the gang-organized crime stemming from 
California-based crack cocaine franchises (T. 1-3) 
Both Senator Fordham and Representative Rushton explained that the model for 
the Utah statute was the California Street Terrorism Prevention Act.31 The apparent 
reason that the Utah statute was drafted without direct reference to its true purpose 
was that the California prosecutors were having difficulties enforcing the explicit 
30The debate on this statute in the legislature is attached in the addendum. 
31
 Attached in the addendum. 
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California Act. That is because the California Act had a very limited purpose 
expressed in the body of the statute. The Utah Statewide Association of Prosecutors 
and other law enforcement groups hoped to avoid those difficulties by drafting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) in a "benign" manner. (T. 8; 2-3) While 
the language of the statue does not expressly indicate, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 
(1953 as amended) was designed to be applied in very narrow circumstances. In 
introducing the bill to the house, Representative Rushton explained its intended 
narrow applicability: 
[T]he idea behind the enhanced penalties in California and 
the idea here was to get that center core, that's the core 
group of hardened criminals that supplies the money, 
supplies the impetus for a true criminal street gang. We've 
got to differentiate that between a street gang and a 
criminal street gang-it's a different would altogether. Ah, 
it gets to the hardened core, and the social workers tell us 
that the only thing to do with them to allow social workers 
to work with the remainder of the young people at risk in 
these gangs is to get that hardened core off the streets. 
The enhanced penalty is designed for that purpose. 
(T. 3) 
During the house floor debates, Representative Joann Millner voiced concern 
that the representatives should take personal responsibility to befriend and rehabilitate 
local street gang members. (T. 4) In response to her comments, Representative 
Rushton reassured, 
And ah, this law is directed at the core, it's not directed, as 
Joann has expressed, kids that are at risk, you see them 
wearing the gang signs, their ball cap turned around 
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backwards on the West, or they sign X other with finger 
signs like this as they go by. Each gang has its own finger 
sign. Ah, these people that are at risk, and these are kids 
at risk. This bill is directed at that core criminal element, 
that three percent of those six hundred gang members that 
have been identified that provide the father figure in these 
gangs. And they provide also the connection the California 
gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine, the money that 
is fueling this explosion of gang activity in our cities and I'd 
like to ask you for your support for this bill . . . 
(T. 7) When Representative Prante asked how the broadly worded statute could be 
limited in its application, as intended, Representative Rushton indicated that the 
proper, limited enforcement of the act was insured by judicial discretion in imposing 
the sentence enhancement. (T. 6-7) 
This enhancement statute was not intended to be applied to a street fight 
during a party where more than three people are involved on any one side as was the 
situation in this case. The statute covers any situation where three or more people 
may be involved in the commission of a crime. The breadth of the statute is not 
logically related to the concerns and intent of the legislature in enacting the 
enhancement statute. 
If the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) fails only 
one of the federal tests it is impermissibly vague and violates the due process clause 
of the federal constitution. The statute also fails the state constitutional test as its 
provisions are not rationally related to its purpose. The application of this provision 
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to enhance appellant's sentence violated his right to due process of law. The 
mandatory minimum sentence enhancement must be ordered vacated. 
B. 
Due Process is Violated by Allowing a Criminal Sentence to 
be Enhanced by Uncharged Conduct of Unnamed Parties. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-206.1 (5)(b) (1953 as amended) provides for sentencing 
enhancements based on uncharged, unproved conduct of others. That part of the 
statute provides: 
It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties 
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is 
alleged to have acted in concert are identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or 
lesser offense. 
Ordinarily, an individual must first be "adjudged guilty of an offense" before he is 
sentenced. Utah Code. Ann. §76-3-101 (1953 as amended). Pursuant to 
subparagraph (5) (b), not only does the individual remain responsible for his own 
actions,32 he is also held accountable for the actions of two other persons. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(5) (b) (1953 as amended). 
These "persons" need not be "identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted". 
i£. Nothing contained within subparagraph (5)(b) guides or limits the discretion of the 
sentencing judge in his "contingent finding" that the enhancement be imposed. Utah 
32A defendant still remains accountable for the underlying crime pursuant to the 
general sentencing provisions. Only the term would be affected by the State's failure 
to prove accomplice liability. 
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Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (5)(c) (1953 as amended) provides "The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable". The accomplices could be exonerated completely. Indeed, the sentence 
of the targeted individual could even be enhanced without establishing any connection 
whatsoever between the individual and the other persons. "Gang" activity would not 
have to actually exist. Mere allegations or the perceived unlawfulness of "in concert" 
behaviors could still improperly support a mandatory minimum enhanced prison term. 
See Utah Code Ann. §76-302-3.1 (5)(b) (1953 as amended). 
In short, since the legislature intended to enhance penalties for "[ojffenses 
committed by three of more persons, proof of accomplice liability must precede the 
enhancement. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(1). Individuals acting in concert with 
less than two persons are penalized elsewhere in the Code and are not necessarily 
subjected to enhanced sentences. Absent proof of the accomplices' convictions, or 
at minimum criminal liability, a defendant can be punished for the acts of another for 
which there is no criminal liability. This is what occurred in the instant case. No 
other persons were convicted of the homicide. Furthermore, the trial judge found that 
the penalty could be enhanced based on the actions of unnamed persons. (R. 346-7) 
Such a procedure is obviously fundamentally unfair and violates a criminal defendant's 




A Defendant is Entitled to a Jury Finding of Criminal 
Liability Under the Statute Before the Sentencing 
Enhancement is Appropriate. 
Article II, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a defendant the right 
to a jury trial. A jury, rather than the judge, should first find that the targeted 
individual acted "in concert with two or more persons." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
203.1 (5)(c) (1953 as amended). This is because Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 
as amended) essentially creates a new crime. 
In State v. Wedae, 652 P.2d 773 (Ore 1982), a jury convicted the defendant 
of first degree robbery for his involvement in the charged offense with two other 
accomplices, lid. at 774. The jury did not necessarily base its verdict on a finding that 
Wedge used a firearm, although that inference may have been raised in the evidence 
presented at trial. At the sentencing proceeding, the court found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Wedge used or threatened to use a firearm in the commission of the 
offense. Wedae, supra at 733 fn. 1 (citing Or. Rev. Stat. 161.610[4]). That statute 
purported to give the sentencing court enhancement power in a manner similar to 
Utah's statute. 
The court agreed with the defendant, explaining that the "use of firearm" was 
not contained specifically in the charged offense: 
Although the challenged statue is denominated an 
enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new crime. 
The jury only considered evidence offered on the question 
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of first degree robbery, and convicted him of that offense, 
but the defendant was sentenced on the basis of having 
been found guilty of the crime of "first degree robbery 
using a firearm.- If the legislature had actually described 
the crime as "first degree robbery using a firearm" the use 
of a firearm would certainly be an element and there would 
be no doubt defendant would have a right to a jury 
determination of guilt. The legislature cannot eliminate 
constitutional protections by separating and relabeling 
elements of a crime. 
652 P.2d at 778. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's "finding beyond a reasonable doubt" that 
Wedge had used a firearm, the appellate court was unwilling to circumvent the 
defendant's right to a jury trial absent proof, to a jury's satisfaction, that Wedge had 
actual physical possession of a gun during the robbery. See id- at 776, 778. The 
enhancement could not stem from the inference that because two of the three 
masked robbers were armed, Wedge was one of the men with a gun. The court 
specifically stated that "there is no statutory basis for enhanced penalty based on 
vicarious liability. . .". id- at 776. 
By analogy, the principles of Wedae apply to Utah's gang enhancement statute. 
Despite a disclaimer to the contrary,33 the enhancement statute creates a new crime 
and punishes an individual without a jury determination on accomplice liability. Like 
the omitted "use of a firearm" element of the first degree robbery offense in Wedae, 
33Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (5)(a) (1953 as amended) provides: "This section 
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense." 
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the "primary offenses" cited by the gang enhancement statute improperly excludes 
proof of an element-accomplice liability. A defendant's right to a jury finding on 
accomplice liability cannot be eviscerated by the trial court's finding made at the time 
of sentencing. Since the gang enhancement statute allows the trial court to add such 
an element into the primary offense for purposes of punishment, the statute violates 
the appellant's right to a jury trial. In Wedae. the court stated, "Because the extent 
of punishment is to be determined according to the existence of the proscribed fact, 
it must be proved at trial". Likewise, in State v. Moeller. 860 P.2d 130 (Or. App. 
1991), the court stated, "facts which go to the criminal acts for which a defendant 
is to be punished must be proved to a jury's satisfaction unless admitted or waived". 
860 P.2dat 132. 
Appellant was not given the opportunity for a jury trial on the issue of the 
sentencing enhancement. The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded 
to the district court for a jury determination on the issue of the sentencing 
enhancement. 
D. 
The Trial Court's Finding that Appellant Acted in Concert 
with Two or More People was Clearly Erroneous. 
In imposing the twenty year minimum mandatory enhancement to appellant's 
life sentence, the trial court entered written findings. Those findings provided: 
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1. The defendant having been found guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree has been adjudged 
guilty of a capital offense for which a life sentence has 
been imposed; 
2. This offense was committed in concert with two or 
more persons, including but not limited to the criminal 
participation in the assaults causing the deaths of Donald 
and Shayne Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel 
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHerrera and others 
unknown, each of which would be criminally liable as 
parties to the offense. 
3. The Court finds no circumstances, in the interests of 
justice, or otherwise, which would justify suspension of 
imposition or the execution of the enhanced sentence. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the enhanced penalty 
provided by Section 76-3-203.1, . . . applies and defendant 
is ordered to serve a minimum term of twenty [20] years in 
prison. 
(R. 346-7) 
In defining the phrase "in concert", Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1)(b) (1953 
as amended) provides: 
Hln concert with two or more persons" as used in 
this section means the defendant and two or more other 
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties 
under Section 76-2-202. 
The parties statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953 as amended) provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
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The mental state required for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 
as amended) is that of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another. 
In its findings, the trial court named four specific individuals who acted "in 
concert" with the appellant. Of those individuals, Anthony DeHerrera was the only 
one against whom evidence was admitted indicating involvement in a homicide. (Tr. 
1014, 1143, 1236) However, if the jury had believed this evidence in its entirety, 
appellant would not have been convicted of the homicide charge. Richard Gabaldon, 
admitted engaging in a fight. (Tr. 636) He admitted to kicking the victims after they 
were down. (Tr. 654, 656) At no time did Gabaldon admit to causing the death of 
anyone or intending to cause the death of another. The State's witnesses testified 
that Gabaldon may have started the fight, but did not have any involvement with any 
knifings. (Tr. 682, 880, 927) Gabaldon was convicted of the lesser included offense 
of aggravated assault. (Tr. 14) Clearly, his involvement did not rise to the level of 
criminal culpability and intent to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 
and 76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended). 
Manuel Martinez and Manuel Alvarez fall into about the same level of 
culpability. Both admitted being outside during the fight. (Tr. 1052, 1092) The only 
evidence of participation in the fight was that Shayne Newingham struck Martinez 
then threw him into a truck rendering Martinez unconscious. (Tr. 1054) Manuel 
Alvarez was also beaten by Shayne Newingham and had his jacket and shirt pulled off 
by Newingham. (Tr. 1092) Alvarez admitted kicking Shayne Newingham after 
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Newingham was the ground. (Tr. 1093) These two individuals also fail to meet the 
statutory requirements of culpability to enhance appellant's sentence. 
The trial court's finding that appellant acted in concert with two or more other 
persons is clearly erroneous. The evidence indicates that only one other person, 
DeHerrera, may have had the requisite intent and performed an act sufficient to 
qualify under the statute. The judgment should be ordered reversed and the minimum 
mandatory twenty year sentence vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is requesting three alternative forms of relief. First, the judgment and 
conviction be reversed and a new trial ordered. The basis for that relief is the 
improprieties in the jury selection process and the improper instruction given to the 
jury on the elements of the offense of first degree murder. In the alternative, 
appellant requests that the judgment and conviction be reversed and the charge 
reduced to second degree murder. That is based on the insufficiency of the evidence 
to prove first degree murder. The final alternative requested by appellant is for the 
judgment to be reversed and the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence vacated. 
That is based on the unconstitutionality of the enhancement statute and the lack of 
sufficient evidence to prove the elements of that statute. 
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